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Big Brother on a Tiny Chip: Ushering in the Age of Global
Surveillance Through the Use of Radio Frequency
Identification Technology and the Need for Legislative
Response
Oleg Kobelev1
I. Introduction: You Can't Run and You Can't Hide
One of the most controversial provisions of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act")
allows the government to track the books people check out of the
library.2 The critics of this provision argue that allowing the
government to monitor what books people read is an
unprecedented invasion of privacy that will erode civil liberties
and chill free speech . These critics may be surprised to learn that
rapid advances in Radio Frequency technology put the private
sector, not the government, on the verge of what can be described
as a massive bugging program. The culprit is a tiny microchip
called a Radio Frequency Identification ("RFID") tag that can be
inserted into everyday household items, thus allowing the
government, or, for that matter, virtually anybody with a scanner to
track the physical location of every carton of milk, every child's
toy, and every pair of socks that consumers buy. Compared to the
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2006.
2 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (2004) (allowing the FBI to compel production of library
circulation records as a part of business records).
3 See generally Kathryn M. Martin, Note, The USA PATRIOTAct's Application
To Library Patron Records,, 29 J. LEGIS. 283 (2003); Jeremy C. Smith,
Comment, The USA Patriot Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National Security, 82
N.C. L. REV. 412 (2003); Ann Beeson and Jameel Jaffer, ACLU, Unpatriotic
Acts: The FBIs Power to Rifle Through Your Records and Personal Belongings
Without Telling You, at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13246&c=206 (July
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
potential privacy threats stemming from the unrestricted use of
these tags, the much feared "sneak-and-peak" provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act look like child's play.
RFID is a technology that allows companies and
governments to implant tiny and virtually undetectable microchips
or "tags" with antennas into almost any product or animal,
including humans. Predicted by MIT researchers to become the
most pervasive computer technology in history,4 most RFID tags
do not require any external power source and can transmit
information via radio waves when the tag enters the reception field
of the nearest scanner. RFID tags are commonly used to store an
Electronic Product Code ("EPC") that assigns a unique identifier to
every RFID chip, thereby allowing fast, efficient, and cost-
effective inventory tracking. 6
The benefits of RFID technology are obvious. The
technology allows for faster checkout times at the grocery store,
significant cost-savings for the companies who can now track their
inventories more efficiently and at a lower cost, and lower prices
for the consumers as companies reduce their overhead costs. The
potential dangers of the misuse of the technology, however, are
much harder to identify with any precision given the relative
infancy of the technology and the lack of response from the
industry.7
The very real danger that unregulated, unrestricted use of
RFID technology poses to privacy is the central theme of this
article. The State Department's plans to embed all US passports
with RFID chips by late 20058 and the news of the Mexican
4 Sanjay E. Sarma et al., Radio Frequency Identification: Security Risks and
Challenges, 6 RSA LABORATORIES CRYPTOBITES 2 (2003).
5 Id. at 4.
6 ld.
7 See Alien Technology Corporation, at http://www.alientechnology.com/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Alien Technology Corporation is arguably the world's largest
manufacturer of RFID chips. It has so far failed to mention anything about the
privacy concerns surrounding the use of RFID on its website or in its press
releases, speeches, or training manuals. This author's repeated requests for
comments on this failure have so far gone unanswered.8 See Susan Llewelyn Leach, Passports Go Electronic With New Microchip,
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government implanting their workers with RFID chips as a means
of accessing restricted areas inside government buildings9
demonstrate the urgent need for closer examination of potential
abuses of RFID technology and ways to prevent such abuse.
This Recent Development seeks to accomplish four main
objectives. First, it describes the nature of RFID technology, and
the risks that RFID technology poses to our privacy by greatly
enhancing location-tracking capabilities of the government, the
companies that use the technology and ordinary criminals that may
abuse it. Second, this Recent Development examines the precise
nature of the privacy rights threatened by RFID technology by
discussing the concept of location privacy-a new understanding
of privacy as freedom of an individual from having his or her
movements monitored without their consent. Third, this Recent
Development demonstrates that existing constitutional and
legislative frameworks are not designed to protect location privacy
from unauthorized privacy violations. Finally, this Recent
Development proposes legislative solutions, including
incorporating the concept of location privacy into the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, regulating RFID technology through
the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to its authority
over public airwaves, and requiring encryption mechanisms in the
RFID tags themselves.
II. Privacy and RFID Technology: Big Threat from a
Little Bug
The origins of RFID technology lie in the Universal
Product Code systems used by manufacturers and retailers to keep
track of their inventories.' 0 At its core, RFID technology is a
natural progression from the familiar optical bar-code technology
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 9, 2004, at 12, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1209/pl 2s0l -stct.html.
9 See Will Weissert, MSNBC News, Microchips Implanted in Mexican Officials,
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5439055/ (July 14, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
10 Uniform Code Council, Inc., Universal Product Code, at http://www.uc-
council.org/upcIbackground.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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currently used in five billion scans a day." The existing optical
bar technology incorporates two different standards-a one-
dimensional bar code used by most manufacturers and two-
dimensional bar codes used by shipping companies such as the
United States Postal Service and United Parcel Service ("UPS").' 2
Unlike these optical codes, RFID auto-identification systems have
two critical advantages: Each chip is assigned its own unique
electronic identifier (whereas a one-dimensional bar code only
allows enough data to identify a broad category) 13 and data can be
read outside the line of sight and through objects such as walls. In
other words, data can be read even if the chip is stacked inside a
box on the top shelf in a warehouse. The items do not need to be
scanned manually.
RFID technology is not new-it has been widely used in
microchips, the manufacturing of automobiles, and even herding
cattle. 13 The basic design is very simple and consists of two main
elements: the RFID tag itself, a microchip with a data storage
capability wired to an antenna coil, and an RFID scanner, a
transmitter that interacts with the chips' writing to modify the
information on the chip. The information from the scanner is
generally sent to a computer database that keeps track of the data
and associates each code with the product it describes.14 Another
important feature of RFID tags is that they are passive and usually
do not require an external power source to keep them operational. 15
The microchip inductively receives power whenever its antenna
receives a radio-impulse from the scanner as if the scanner
"shouts" to the passive tag, bringing it to life and allowing
transmission.16 While the current range of the scanners is limitedto two to five feet on passive tags, this range can be greatly
1Id.
12 See The Barcode Software Center, Barcode Symbologies and Label
Standards, at http://www.mecsw.com/specs/speclist.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2005) (describing various standards used in the industry) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
13 Sarma et al., supra note 4, at 2.
14 Id. at 4.
15 There are active tags wired to a battery, which allows for much greater range,
but due to higher costs they are less widespread. Id.
16id.
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enhanced by developing more powerful and sophisticated scanners
or by simply increasing the density of the existing scanners.
The crucial difference between RFID technology "then"
and RFID technology "now" is the cost. The recent advances in
miniaturization and micro-chip manufacturing have lowered prices
so dramatically as to allow RFID chips to currently cost around
fifty cents, with MIT's studies projecting the cost to drop to five
cents in two to three years. 17 As the price of RFID technology
plummets, companies will become more cost-efficient by installing
RFID technology into a wider range of products.18
It is hard to overstate the benefits of implementing RFID
tracking technology. Soon companies will have instant 24-hour-a-
day information on the location and quantity of each item in their
inventory, as well as the movement of those items through
distribution channels. In the ideal world, both retailers and
manufacturers will have interoperable online databases instantly
tracking the movement of every piece of their inventory at all
times. Imagine every retailer and manufacturer, no matter how
small, having the same inventory management capabilities as the
famously efficient Wal-Mart 19 but at a fraction of the cost.
Nonetheless, the great advantages of RFID technology
come with a cost, reaffirming Milton Friedman's famous aphorism
that there is no free lunch. The downside, or perhaps the
consequence, of low-cost REID technology is the lack of a viable
encryption mechanism to protect the data on the chip from
unintended use. Low power consumption, slow read rates, as well
as the storage and computing capacities of RFID chips all fall far
below the requirements for encryption systems used on microchips
elsewhere. 20 Thus, various "phishing' ' 1 techniques that are rapidly
1d. at 3-5.
18Id. at 2-3.
19See The Wal-Mart Empire: A Simple Formula and Unstoppable Growth,
RESEARCH AT PENN, at
http://www.upenn.edu/researchatpenn/article.php?63 1 &bus (Apr. 9, 2003)
(describing the efficiency of Wal-Mart operations) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).20 RFID tags generally have about 250 to 1000 security gates (microchip circuits
available for encryption), whereas most symmetrical encryption algorithms
requires 20,000 to 30,000 security gates. Sarma et al., supra note 4, at 5.
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gathering steam on the Internet can be modified by computer
hackers to extract the contents of RFID chips. It would be even
easier for unscrupulous companies to use RFID technology to track
customers' buying habits and, as such, conduct their market
research cheaply and without the participant's consent. Finally,
the government may either commandeer the existing networks or
establish their own to conduct its surveillance uninhibited by either
legislative or constitutional constraints. Government surveillance
may take a variety of forms from matching customers' purchases
against computer databases for signs of suspicious activity22 to
tracking a person's physical location as a means of electronic
surveillance.
The lack of security combined with a low cost of RFID
technology has the potential to fundamentally change the way we
view privacy, leading to a world in which our physical location is
never safe from the prying eye of the government, companies, or a
21 Phishing is
the act of sending an email to a user falsely claiming to be an
established legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user
into surrendering private information that will be used for
identity theft. The email directs the user to visit a Web site
where they are asked to update personal information, such as
passwords and credit card, social security, and bank account
numbers, that the legitimate organization already has. The
Web site, however, is bogus and set up only to steal the user's
information.
WEBOPEDIA COMPUTER DICTIONARY, at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/phishing.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
22 The government has already attempted to create a similar system in the
context of airline security with the CAPPS II program that was later scrapped
because of technical difficulties and privacy concerns. See Mimi Hall &
Barbara DeLollis, Plan to Collect Flier Data Canceled, USA TODAY, July 15,
2004, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-07-
14-fly-planx.htm. CAPPS II as described in 68 Fed. Reg. 45265 (Aug. 1,
2003) was designed to automatically cross-reference the data each passenger
provided to the airline companies when purchasing a ticket against a wide
variety of governmental, public and commercial databases in order to conduct a
risk assessment of the likelihood of that passenger being a security risk.
Depending upon the relative score that each passenger received, the database
would automatically flag the passengers with elevated scores for additional
screening at the airports or, in some circumstances, for immediate detention.
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hacker. As RFID technology proliferates, it will literally surround
future consumers wherever they go and whatever they do. While
RFID technology is only one of a host of other technological
devices that could be abused to violate consumers' location
privacy,23 it has three critical differences not found in other
technologies that make it a true "iber-bug": low price, passivity
(not requiring external power source), and very small size. While
one can conceivably turn off his or her cell phone and disable GPS
devices, RFID chips cannot be turned off or even easily found due
to their miniature size. Therefore, it is particularly disturbing that
no effective constitutional or legal constraints currently exist to
protect consumer privacy from the threat that this technology
represents.
III. Location Privacy and the Constitution: The Steep Road
to Nowhere
The concept of privacy has developed slowly in the United
States. While there is no direct mention of the word privacy in the
Constitution, common law in both the United States and England
sought to punish eavesdropping. 24 While the passage of the Fourth
Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
25
carried out by government actors and the Fifth Amendment
prohibited compelling self-incrimination,26 the exact contours of
how these protections related to eavesdropping remained unclear.
23 See generally Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls?
Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 3 81
(2003) (reviewing privacy threats from the use of cell phones); Marc Jonathan
Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the
Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REv.
1349 (2004).
24 "Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and
mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at the court-leet; or
are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding of sureties for
[their] good behavior," 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 169 (1769).25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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In Olmstead v. United States,27 Olmstead, a Seattle bootlegger,
challenged his conviction by arguing that government wiretapping
should have been suppressed as a violation of his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Taft,
disagreed, holding that Fourth Amendment search and seizure
protections did not apply to government wiretapping because no
physical trespass had taken place and no actual papers or other
tangible evidence were seized.28 The Court also rejected
Olmstead's Fifth Amendment challenge, holding that since he was
not compelled to use the phone to offer incriminating evidence, his
Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.29 Similarly, in both
Goldman v. United States30 and On Lee v. United States3 1 the
Court continued its insistence that physical trespass was the proper
trigger for protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, thus
excluding from their reach evidence obtained through electronic
eavesdropping by government agents.
This formalistic view first began to unravel in Silverman v.
United States,3 a where the government inserted a "spike mike" into
the common wall of a row house in which the recorded
conversation took place. 33 Instead of dwelling on the intricacies of
property law in determining whether actual trespass had occurred,
the Court held:
[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion. ... But [our] decision here does not turn
upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall
as a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality
of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally
27 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
28 Id. at 466.
29 Id. at 462.
30 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (using a dictaphone to secretly tape conversation in the
next office did not violate Fourth Amendment since there was no trespass).
31 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (secretly recording a conversation in the public laundry
room did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections since the area was open to
the public).
32 365 U.S. 505 (1961).33 Id. at 506.
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protected area."
34
Shortly after Silverman, the Court dispensed with the
notion that trespass to real property was necessary to trigger the
protections of the Fourth Amendment altogether. In Katz v. United
States,35 a bookie was convicted of using a public phone to take
and place bets. His conversations were recorded by a listening
device set outside the phone booth. The Court specifically
repudiated the Olmstead and Goldman trespass doctrines, stating
that "[t]he fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance." 36 The new expectation-of-privacy
based definition that emerged consisted, in Justice Harlan's words,
of a "twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable. 37
Despite the broad language of Katz and the attendant
requirement of warrants for government wiretapping, the Court's
decision has been largely limited to the contents of the
conversation, rather than giving any meaningful protection from
the government tracking the physical location of an individual-
the concept referred in this article as location privacy. Thus, the
federal courts have not yet recognized "location privacy" as falling
within the "reasonable expectation of privacy" prong of the Katz
analysis. Almost every case challenging the propriety of
warrantless government surveillance of a persons' physical
location has been rebuked by the courts as outside the scope of the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
In a harbinger of things to come, the Supreme Court held in
Smith v. Marylan3 8 that there was no expectation of privacy in
dialing phone numbers. In Smith, police used a pen register (a
device used to record numbers dialed from a particular telephone
and identify their location) to record numbers from a home of the
34Id. at 511-12.
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36 Id. at 353.
37 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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man thought to be threatening a robbery victim.39 The court held
that using a pen register did not constitute search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because there was
no expectation of privacy in dialing phone numbers.40 In what has
now become a standard justification for refusing to incorporate
location privacy into the Fourth Amendment, the Court
emphasized the voluntary nature of dialing the number, reasoning
that Smith "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, [Smith]
assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed." 41
In an even more glaring rejection of location privacy, the
Court in United States v. Knotts42 found no expectation of privacy
when the government attached a radio-tracking device to a canister
of chemicals subsequently traced to the house of the defendant.
Ominously stating that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation ofprivacy in
his movements from one place to another...,, the Court deemed
that traditional expectations of privacy do not attach to movements
that can potentially be observed through "visual surveillance from
public places. 44 In Knotts and its progeny,45 the Court has
interpreted the Katz rule narrowly, allowing electronic surveillance
in virtually all places where a potential for visual observation
exists. The only bright spot for location privacy advocates is the
Court's consistent recognition of the home as a traditional zone of
39 ld. at 737.
40 Id. at 742-43.
41 Id. at 744.
42 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
43 Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
44Id. at 282.
45 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that aerial
observation of the home from 1000 feet by police looking for drugs did not
violate Fourth Amendment because "[i]n an age where private and commercial
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect
that his... [drugs] were constitutionally protected from being observed with the
naked eye from an altitude of 1000 feet"); Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S.
227, 238-39 (1986) (using precision aerial mapping camera does not violate
Fourth Amendment where the area being watched is more akin to an open field).
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privacy,46 thus forbidding warrantless use of tracking devices
inside the house 47 and the use of "peeking technolov" to look
inside property otherwise hidden from public view.
It is also worth noting that the holding in Smith is being
increasingly questioned in light of a new test articulated in Kyllo v.
United States.49 In Kyllo, the Court held that using thermal
imaging technology to locate marijuana plants growing inside the
defendant's house constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 50 Under the new Kyllo test, the insides of the
house are off limits to any technology, no matter how
"unobtrusive" the technology may be. 51 Thus, the use of pen
registers, which are not in general public use, may be considered
unconstitutional under this new test if the phone number is dialed
from inside the house.
Overall, under the Court's current reading of the Fourth
Amendment, with the limited exception of privacy within one's
house, the concept of location privacy has not yet gathered enough
legitimacy to be recognized as privacy worth protecting. Despite
criticism,52 the Court continues to insist that the potential for visual
observation defeats the reasonable expectation of privacy.
46 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) ("[T]he Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins
of the Republic."') (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 US 573, 601 (1980)).
47 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
48 See infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
49 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
'0 Id. at 34.
51 Id. at 35-36.
52 See Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the
Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593 (1987) (criticizing the court's
concept of privacy as too limited and individualistic and arguing that a concept
of shared privacy within the confines of a narrow group but limited to the
outside world is equally worth protecting); see also Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727, 740 (1993) (disputing the Court's
finding of no reasonable expectation where one shares information with third
parties, and finding that most people surveyed viewed government inspection of
their bank records to be highly intrusive and unreasonable).
IV. Location Privacy and Legislative Regulation: Not
Seeing the Forest for the Trees
In addition to the constitutional provisions of the Fourth
Amendment, the Federal government and virtually all states5 3 have
enacted statutory provisions dealing with electronic surveillance
and wiretapping. While different in coverage, goals, and
implementation, these statutes are almost uniform in their rejection
of location privacy as being worthy of protection.
The centerpiece of federal legislation in this area is the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") of 1986,"4 the
successor to the Title III Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968." Among the goals of the ECPA was a desire to
update eavesdropping regulations to address current technology
and avoid unnecessary restrictions on then emerging fields of
56communications technology. In 1994, as a response to rapidly
changing technology, Congress sought to augment police authority
to use the latest electronic surveillance tools by adopting the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA"). 57 Furthermore, Congress significantly expanded the
government's surveillance and wiretapping authority following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks with the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act," the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002, 59 and the Department of Homeland Security Act
2002.60
In general, the ECPA outlaws various forms of electronic
eavesdropping, as well as possession of eavesdropping equipment,
and use and disclosure of information obtained via illegal
53 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287 (2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §250.05
(2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §631 (wire), 632 (oral), 632.7 (electronic) (2003).
14 8 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2004).
51 8 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1970 ed.).
16 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
51 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2522 (1994), and 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
58 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
'9 Pub. L. No. 107-108, 115 Stat. 1394 (2001).
60 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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eavesdropping.61 The ECPA also establishes separate crimes for
unlawful access to stored information, 62 and unlawful use of a pen
register or a trap and trace device.63 At its core, the ECPA outlaws
intentional interception or attempts of interception of any wire, oral
or electronic communication by using electronic or mechanical
devices. 64 However, the ECPA specifically exempts from its
definition of communication "any communication from a tracking
device" 65 which it subsequently identifies as "[an] electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of
a person or object. ',66 The rationale behind this specific exclusion
evidently stems from the fact that Congress sought to protect the
content of the communications as opposed to restricting the
physical means with which these communications were captured.67
As currently written, the ECPA does not protect location
privacy or prohibit unauthorized tracking with RFID devices. The
courts have recently confirmed this reading of the statute in United
States v. Forest,68 where Drug Enforcement Administration agents
turned a suspect's cellular phone into a mobile tracking device,
thus revealing his general location. 69 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that neither the ECPA nor the Fourth
Amendment required suppression of evidence in the defendant's
drug trial.7°
61 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2004).
63 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2004).
64 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
65 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (2004).
66 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2004).
67 See Congressional Findings, 801 of Pub.L. 90-35 1.
[I]n order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications .... it is necessary for Congress to define...
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized, to prohibit any
unauthorized interception of such communications, and the
use of the contents thereof in evidence in courts and
administrative proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added).
68 355 F.3d 942 (2004), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 1050 (2005).
69 Id. at 947.
70 Id. at 950-52; see also United States v. NY Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159
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The only piece of legislation that acknowledges location
privacy is the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act ("CALEA"), 71 which deals with telephone communications
and is not directly applicable to RFID technology. CALEA
requires telecommunication carriers to make their equipment
capable of transmitting "call-identifying information," 72 but it also
specifically prohibits the use of technology (other than pen
registers and similar devices) that would reveal the user's physical
location. 73 The interpretation and enforcement of the statute is
delegated to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), 74
making the agency responsible for promulgating procedures to
ensure compliance. This provides one way in which the existing
regulatory framework may be extended to cover RFID technology.
Unfortunately, the recent history of the FCC's approach to location
privacy casts serious doubt on enacting privacy-friendly policies
without prodding from Congress. 75
In short, all of the existing legislative acts in which
Congress addressed the issue of privacy seem to either specifically
allow or at least tacitly permit virtually unrestricted tracking and
monitoring of individuals by both the government and private
actors. When this lack of legislative protection is viewed in
combination with the courts' refusal to find an expectation of
privacy in a person's physical location outside the home, the
(1977) (holding trap and trace devices do not capture contents of the defendant's
speech and are therefore outside the scope of Title III protection).
7' 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002-1021 (2004).
72 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(A).
71 Id. at § 1002(a)(2)(B).
74 47 U.S.C. § 229(a) (2004).
75 In the area of wireless communications, the FCC has interpreted CALEA to
require telecommunications carriers to provide call-identifying information such
as location and origin of the call to law-enforcement agencies, thus allowing the
tracking of cell-phone users at all times. See In re Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 16794, 16815(1999). As a result, privacy advocates argued that FCC was threatening civil
liberties by giving the federal government new tools for surveillance. See
William Mathews, Privacy Advocates Challenge FBI Cell Phone Tracking, FED.
COMPUTER WK., at http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2000/0124/web-privacy-
01-24-OO.asp (Jan. 24, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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picture that emerges is quite grim. The unconsented monitoring of
citizens' whereabouts is perfectly legal. 76 While in the pre-RFID
world this situation was tolerable simply due to the limitations and
expense of the available tracking technology, the advent of RFID,
with its cheap and efficient tracking mechanisms and its ubiquity
in the marketplace, greatly magnifies the threat to people's
privacy.
V. Solutions: And the Answer is ...
RFID technology is poised to have a promising future as it
gradually replaces the bar code as the identifier of choice for
manufacturers and retailers alike, increasing efficiency and
lowering prices for consumers. Any solution must strike a careful
and delicate balance to protect consumer privacy without
threatening the viability and the great potential that this technology
holds. Legislative initiative designed to protect location privacy
could be one such answer. However, to succeed, this initiative
must establish rules that are flexible enough to adapt to the still-
fluid technology, vigorous enough to prompt change in the RFID
industry, and firm enough to provide the same level of privacy to
physical location as is currently afforded to other forms of privacy
such as content-based privacy.
I propose a three pronged approach. First, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") 77 must be amended to
specifically include location tracking in the definition of
"communications" as defined in the Act.78 Second, built-in
security protections must be required in all RFID tags placed on
goods that are sold to the general public. Third, the FCC must be
delegated the task of regulating the use of public airwaves by the
76 The deterrent effect of private causes of action such as trespass claims or tort
claims seems dubious at best, given the fact that the subjects are unlikely to
bring forth the claims without a showing of significant damages simply due to
the inherent costs of civil litigation. It is unclear how RFID tracking can lead to
such damages. Furthermore, it is increasingly unlikely that the subjects will
even be aware of such tracking in the first place, reducing the deterrent effect
further.
77 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2004).
78 Id.
RFID devices as to minimize the risks to consumer privacy. The
combination of these three measures will outlaw troublesome
surveillance and create real-world safeguards against the abuse of
RFID technology.
The first prong of the initiative, while seemingly simple,
requires the fundamental rethinking of rationales behind the
ECPA, which contemplated privacy in terms of contents of
communications between persons, 79 not location privacy of a
person in a physical environment. 80 The recent attempts by the
Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States to reconcile the uses of
new technology with the original meaning of the FourthAm 81
Amendment should be a sign for Congress to take the lead and
extend these protections beyond the narrow confines of one's
home. Such Congressional initiative would recognize the broader
reality that in an increasingly crowded society, the expectation of
privacy flows from privacy found in anonymity in a crowd as
much as it does from privacy in one's home.
The second prong, while more technical, is just as
important. No matter how tough the privacy laws, leaving the
RFID architecture completely open to attack is akin to leaving a
door to one's house ajar in hopes that no one will burglarize it.
The legal framework protecting location privacy must be fortified
with practical measures necessary to make violations of the law
79 See Congressional Findings, 801 of PUB.L. 90-351.
[I]n order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications .... it is necessary for Congress to define...
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized, to prohibit any
unauthorized interception of such communications, and the
use of the contents thereof in evidence in courts and
administrative proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added).
80 As it is currently written, ECPA explicitly excludes tracking devices,
electronic information stored by financial institution or any communication from
a tone-only paging device, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2004).81 In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Court held that technology
that is not in general use when used to monitor activities inside one's house
violates the Fourth Amendment search provisions, regardless of how unintrusive
it may be, excluding the evidence gathered from the use of thermal imaging
device.
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more difficult and less widespread. A wide array of encryption
technologies are available to accomplish this task-including
killing tags after the purchase is made, encrypting the signal with
the timed option to self-destruct, and many others-all
seeking to make the illegal surveillance more difficult to
accomplish.82
Finally, Congress should delegate the task of establishing
the rules governing the radio-communication between the RFID
tags and the scanners to the FCC. This is important because
regulatory agencies have the necessary expertise and experience in
developing rules that best achieve the balance of the interests of all
the stakeholders in the process. As such, the FCC may be asked to
determine the optimal range and frequency of signals allowed for
the RFID scanners to use, and perhaps require that placement of
the tags and the scanners be clearly marked for the consumers to




RFID technology presents complex issues concerning the
delicate balance between privacy, efficiency, technology, and the
unintended consequences of its use. While by no means
unsolvable, these problems are urgent enough to demand a
vigorous and proactive approach, rather than passively reacting to
the problems as the technology matures enough to make any
coherent regulation impractical or, worse, impossible. One need
look no further than the continuous problem of email spam, the
futility of all technical and legislative initiatives to curb it, and the
82 See Sarma et al, supra note 4 at 7 (2003) (describing these methods and other
methods to improve RFID security). But see RFID Position Statement, at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm (Nov. 20, 2003) (critiquing
these methods as inadequate) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
83 The Presidential control over the FCC pursuant to Exec. Order 12866 has the
potential to jeopardize the proper functioning of the FCC as a watchdog of
governmental intrusion. Proper Congressional oversight as well as clear rules
governing applicability of RFID regulations to all governmental and non-
governmental actors may be needed to adequately protect the public.
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tremendous costs for both consumers and businesses associated
with this problem8 4 to recognize the need to regulate emerging
technologies early and often for the sake of all the participants
involved. Amending ECPA to include location privacy as a form
of protected communication, requiring built-in encryption in RFD
tags themselves, and giving the FCC regulatory oversight over the
use of the technology may help solve the problem before it is too
late.
84 See Jonathan Krim, Spam's Cost to Business Escalates: Bulk E-mail
Threatens Communication Arteries, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at AO1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A 17754-2003Marl 2.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. IVOL. 6
